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Abstract 
 
Do you know your own desires in some way that other people cannot know them? Richard 
Moran claims that his influential theory of first-person authority over beliefs and intentions 
can also cover desires. However, his deliberative model can apply to desire only if one 
already has some other way of knowing one’s own desires. Jean-Paul Sartre’s conception of 
pure reflection, on the other hand, portrays a direct epistemic access to one’s own desires 
that can ground fundamental first-person authority over desires and intentions. 
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How do you know what you want? Discussions of self-knowledge in contemporary 
anglophone philosophy tend to focus primarily on how one knows one’s own beliefs. This 
is one aspect of a more general emphasis on the epistemic aspect of the mind. Our status 
as knowers is subject to far more philosophical scrutiny in this tradition than our status as 
doers. There is significant attention paid to our knowledge of our own intentions, primarily 
due to the influence of Elizabeth Anscombe’s richly insightful book Intention. But this 
approach to practical agency shares with the emphasis on beliefs a focus on the reasoning 
aspect of the mind. There is very little discussion of knowledge of one’s own desires, even 
though desire would seem to be closer than intention to the core of what it is to be a 
creature that seeks to bring about change in the world. This was, by contrast, the focus of a 
strong tradition of European philosophy whose primary exponents published their greatest 
works in this area in the first half of the twentieth century. 
 
Richard Moran has drawn on this work of one of these philosophers, Jean-Paul Sartre, in 
the development of his sophisticated and influential theory of self-knowledge. This theory 
holds that our epistemic authority to report our own mental states rests on our agential 
authority to form those mental states. Despite this emphasis on agency in describing the 
process underlying first-person authority, however, Moran’s theory shares with the 
anglophone tradition that he primarily engages with a strong emphasis on beliefs and 
intentions as the objects of self-knowledge. Although he intends his theory to apply equally 
to desire, he provides very little discussion focused on this application of it. This is 
unfortunate, as we will see, for if we begin the inquiry focusing on the desires at the core of 
agency as contents of self-knowledge, then there emerges a rather different picture of first-
person authority. This alternative account, moreover, is one that is closer to the overall 
position that Sartre develops in the very same works that Moran discusses. 
 
To see this, we will begin by clarifying Moran’s account of first-person authority over belief 
as consisting in the deliberative authority to form one’s own beliefs. We will then consider 
two ways in which this might be thought to apply to the case of desire, finding that one 
cannot form desires by deliberating only over whether something is objectively good, but 
that one can do so by considering whether it is subjectively attractive. This deliberation, 
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however, rests on already having epistemic access to one’s existing desires. We will then 
turn to Sartre’s theory that desires feature in experience by influencing the way the world 
appears to one. The ability to shift attention from the world itself to the way it seems, 
which is Sartre’s form of phenomenological reflection, thus grounds direct epistemic access 
to one’s desires. We will then see why this form of self-knowledge is the fundamental form 
of first-person authority over both desires and intentions. Finally, we will see that Moran 
has overlooked this aspect of self-knowledge in part through focusing on one strand of 
Sartre’s thought at the expense of another that is in tension with it. 
 
1. Moran on the Transparency of Belief 
 
Moran argues that there are two distinct routes to knowledge of one’s own beliefs. One 
route is theoretical reflection, which is inference on the basis of observation of one’s 
speech and other behaviour. This form of self-knowledge is not inherently first-personal, 
since the very same evidence is available to other observers. Indeed, some of this evidence, 
such as facial expressions, might be better available to others. The other route is what 
Moran sometimes calls ‘practical reflection’ or ‘deliberative reflection’ (e.g. 2001: 59). If 
asked whether I believe that p, then in many cases I can answer by directing my attention to 
whether p is true. This ‘transparency’ of belief, according to Moran, grounds the inherently 
first-personal route to self-knowledge. For one can answer questions about one’s own 
beliefs in this way, but not questions about other people’s beliefs. What is more, this route 
to self-knowledge is integral to rational agency itself, since it rests on one’s ability to form 
one’s own beliefs. Where this form of self-knowledge fails, one can discern one’s beliefs 
only through theoretical reflection. If a belief is insensitive to one’s rational judgment in 
this way, then one is alienated from it. It is not fully one’s own if it is independent of one’s 
endorsement through such a failure of rationality. 
 
In his book Authority and Estrangement, where the theory is developed most fully, Moran 
often explicates this idea of transparency as the question of whether one believes that p 
being answerable by addressing the question of whether one is to believe that p, or has 
good reason to believe that p. Thus, for example, ‘a person is credited with first person 
authority when we take the question of what he does believe to be settled by his decision as 
to what he is to believe’ (2001: 134). Moran’s idea here is that if one deliberates about what 
one is to believe, one must be assuming that this will decide one’s belief (2001: 94-5). For 
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this reason, Moran sometimes describes the question of whether one believes that p as 
transparent, from one’s own perspective, to the question of whether p is true (2001: 74-7, 
85). This raises the question of how we should understand the relation between considering 
whether p is true and considering whether one should believe that p. Which should one 
directly consider in order to exercise first-person authority over one’s beliefs? 
 
There are good reasons to reject the idea that the question of what one believes is directly 
transparent to the question of what one should believe. For one might judge that one has 
good reason to believe that p without thereby believing that p. For example, one’s reasons 
might be ‘good enough to permit belief in p, without requiring belief in p, and thereby also 
permitting suspension of belief in p’ (Way 2007: 228). If one exercises first-person authority 
by considering what one has good reason to believe, then in this case one would have the 
authority to claim to believe that p even if one had suspended belief whether p. Moran 
could not classify this as a failure of first-person authority due to a failure of the rationality 
that grounds that authority, since this suspension of belief is rationally permitted. 
Moreover, the question whether one has good reason to believe that p itself has a reflective 
aspect. If the question of what one believes is transparent to the question of what one has 
reason to believe, then we need an account of how one finds out what one’s reasons for 
belief are. This cannot be a matter of observational self-knowledge, for if it were then the 
relevant information would be publicly available and so would not ground a form of first-
person authority. What is required is a further form of self-knowledge. If there is such a 
form of self-knowledge, it might undermine the motivation for Moran’s account of non-
observational self-knowledge by fulfilling the role for which he proposes that account 
(O’Brien 2003, 379). 
 
Moran’s theory is therefore best interpreted as holding that the question of whether one 
believes that p is directly transparent to the question of whether p is true, with his emphasis 
on having reasons to believe that p indicating the practical procedure that one needs to 
adopt for rationally deciding whether p is true (O’Brien 2003: 379). To put the point 
another way, the question about what one believes is only indirectly transparent to the 
question about what one has reason to believe, where one should consider one’s own 
reasons only in the service of the prior question of what the truth is. Moran seems to 
endorse this reading that accords the truth of p priority over reasons for believing p when 
he writes, in a paper discussing his book, that transparency means that ‘a person answers 
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the question whether he believes that p in the same way he would address himself to the 
question whether p itself’ (2004: 457; see also 2004: 468; 2012: 235). 
 
It follows from this that we should not accept Moran’s claim that the transparency ‘of first-
person belief reports’ has its ‘source in the primacy of a deliberative rather than a 
theoretical stance towards one’s own state of mind’ (2001: 64). It rather has its source in 
deliberation about the world, which does not require any sort of stance towards one’s own 
state of mind. It is likewise misleading to describe this process as ‘deliberative reflection’, 
since it does not essentially include oneself or one’s mind in its content. It is true that one 
can announce the result of the deliberation either by ‘p is true’ or by ‘I believe that p’, 
because the judgment that p makes it the case, at that time at least, that the judger believes 
that p. It is also true that this avowal of one’s own belief is a reflective formulation of the 
affirmation of its embedded proposition. But this reflectivity belongs to the report, not to 
the deliberative process that resulted in it. Only one of the two routes to knowing one’s 
own beliefs that Moran discusses, therefore, is a form of reflection. This is the ‘theoretical 
reflection’ that relies on evidence that is available to other observers as well as to oneself. 
 
2. Desire and Desirability 
 
What leads Moran to slip between the question of the truth of p and the question of 
whether to believe that p? Perhaps it results from his aim of formulating a unified account 
of transparency across mental states of different kinds. If asked whether I intend that p, for 
example whether I intend that I go to the cinema this evening, then I cannot answer this by 
considering whether p is true, for to do that would be to make a prediction rather than 
form an intention. Thus, it is more plausible to say that the question whether I intend that p 
is transparent to the question whether to intend that p, rather than to the question whether 
p is true (Way 2007: 225). Questions about my beliefs and my intentions differ, therefore, 
in the questions to which they are transparent for me. But their properties of transparency 
are nevertheless unified at a higher level of generality. For in both cases, if these claims are 
correct, one can answer the question about one’s mental state through the deliberation that 
forms that mental state. 
 
What about desire? If questions about what one wants are also transparent, then what is 
the nature of the deliberation whose conclusion can at once form and announce one’s 
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desire? It may be objected that desires are not generally formed in this way. But the theory 
does not require that they are. Neither does it require that beliefs or intentions are generally 
formed by deliberation. It requires only that one can answer a question about these mental 
states through deliberation whose conclusion forms the mental state that it announces. It 
might still be objected, however, that we have first-person authority to report desires that 
we feel but which cannot be formed or reshaped by deliberation. Moran’s strategy for 
dealing with this objection is to distinguish between mere bodily desires and judgment-
sensitive rational desires (2001: 114-8). He does not provide an account of how we know 
our bodily desires, but since he sees these as impinging on the rational mind from without 
we can assume that he considers our awareness of them to be a form of sensation or 
perception (2001: 114-5).  
 
There are good reasons not to accept Moran’s distinction between two kinds of desire 
(Webber 2016: §§ 3-4). For present purposes, however, we can formulate our question 
solely in terms of those desires that Moran considers to be sensitive to deliberative 
judgment. What is the subject primarily aiming to discern through the deliberation to which 
these desires are purportedly sensitive? It cannot be the truth of the content of the desire. 
My desire that p cannot be formed by deliberation about whether p is true. It must rather 
be formed through deliberation about whether p is desirable, as Moran acknowledges 
(2001: 57, 60). So if I am asked whether I want to go to the cinema this evening, if this 
theory is correct, I cannot answer by considering whether I do go to the cinema this 
evening, but I can answer by considering whether my going to the cinema this evening is 
desirable. The judgment produced by this deliberation would both form and announce my 
desire. 
 
How should we understand the notion of desirability in play here? It could be read 
objectively, to mean that the deliberation is concerned with whether p is or would be good. 
This would parallel the idea that one’s belief about p can be formed and announced 
through deliberation about whether p is true. In both cases, the deliberation would make no 
essential reference to the subject’s own mental states. It would rather be wholly concerned 
with some aspect of the world beyond that mind. For this reason, deliberation about 
whether some possible state of affairs is or would be good is not a form of reflection. 
One’s deliberative conclusion could be announced in the form of the avowal ‘I want that 
p’, but this reflectivity would be a feature of the avowal rather than the deliberation. 
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Moreover, this might be thought to embody a normative feature of desire that parallels a 
normative feature of belief. It might be argued that one ought to desire what is good just as 
one ought to believe what is true, so these forms of transparency reflect a normative 
demand of rationality. 
 
Alternatively, however, we could understand the deliberation to concern desirability in the 
subjective sense. That is, it might be deliberation about whether p is attractive rather than 
about whether p is good. I would determine whether I desire something by deciding 
whether I have good reason to desire it. The transparency of the question of one’s own 
desire would parallel that of the question of one’s own intention. This practical 
deliberation, moreover, would be a form of reflection, since it would need to take into 
account one’s existing motivational states. In order to decide whether to intend that p, one 
would need to consider how p would fit with one’s other desires and intentions. Likewise, 
to consider whether p is attractive to one requires considering its relation to one’s existing 
desires. Should we understand the purported transparency of desire to parallel that of 
intention in this way? Or should we understand it in the way that parallels the transparency 
of belief? 
 
3. The Desirable As The Good 
 
Moran’s theory of first-person authority requires that deliberation culminate in a judgment 
that forms the relevant mental state. It does not require that deliberation always or 
necessarily has this effect. But it does require that this should be the normal result of 
deliberative judgment, with other cases being failures of rational functioning. For otherwise 
one would not in general be warranted in answering a question about one’s mental state by 
forming a judgment about the object of that mental state. Deliberation about p could 
warrant the avowal ‘I desire that p’, for example, only if judgments arrived at through that 
kind of deliberation generally had the effect of forming one’s desires. For this reason, it 
seems that first-person authority over whether I desire that p cannot be grounded in 
deliberation over whether p is good. The judgment that p is good does not in general result 
in the desire that p, the judgment that p is not good does not in general result in the 
absence of desire that p, and the judgment that p is bad does not in general result in the 
desire that not-p. 
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The most obvious examples of this rational insensitivity of desire to judgments of 
goodness are ones that are bound up with bodily needs, whether these are like hunger and 
thirst in being intrinsic to the functioning of the human body or whether they are like the 
smoker’s desire for a cigarette in being an acquired appetite. But this insensitivity is a 
feature of desires more generally. One might decide that it would be good to start cycling 
to work instead of driving, but still want to drive. One might judge that spending the day 
rewatching old movies would not be a good use of one’s time, but want to do it anyway. 
One might decide that speaking one’s mind to one’s boss on this occasion would be a bad 
move, but still want to do so. Philosophers have puzzled over exactly how one can end up 
doing something other than what one judges to be good. But the point here does not 
concern akratic action. The point is just that it is quite common to continue to have a 
desire that runs contrary to one’s judgment, whether or not one then acts on that desire. 
 
Can these cases be understood in terms of the distinction between desiring the object and 
desiring an aspect of the object? It certainly can happen, for example, that I judge that 
cycling is preferable to driving when all things are considered, but nevertheless still want 
the easier physical activity of driving. But this distinction does not capture every way in 
which desires that are not rooted in bodily needs might persist despite contrary judgments. 
For it may not simply be a desire for an aspect of driving that survives my judgment that 
cycling is better. It may instead be the desire to drive. That is, the desire for the object, with 
all of its aspects, survives the contrary judgment about that object in light of all of its 
aspects. This may perhaps be explained by the relative weights I place on the various 
aspects of the object in deliberation differing from the relative strengths of my desires for 
those aspects. But whatever the explanation, it seems that the object of the judgment does 
match the object of the desire. 
 
In discussing his book, Moran provides an example where the judgment and the contrary 
desire concern the same aspect of the object, rather than merely the same object. His 
example is judging some activity to be unworthy of desire due to its disgusting character. 
Not only is it true that a desire for the activity can survive this judgment, but moreover 
‘surely some activity’s disgusting character can be just what appeals to me and makes the 
pursuit of it alluring, even rewarding, even if it conflicts with other values of mine’ (2004: 
472). This is not a case where one judges the activity good despite finding it disgusting, but 
rather a case of wanting something for those aspects of it that one judges to be bad. Moran 
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does not classify this as a case of rational malfunction. If he did, then he would need to 
claim that first-person authority over desire fails in this case, that one can only learn of the 
desire through observation, and that one would thus be alienated from the desire. Rather, 
he agrees that these implications are not right. It is, he writes, ‘a desire for that thing because 
it is both trivial and disgusting, something I desire under that very aspect; and yet I still 
acknowledge it as my own’ (2004: 472). 
 
How is it possible to have first-person authority in such a case, on Moran’s account? He 
does not give a clear answer to this. He does agree that ‘what is said about belief will only 
carry over’ to this kind of case with ‘substantial modifications’ and that ‘any connection 
between desire and being found worth desiring has to be interpreted very broadly to be 
psychologically realistic at all’ (2004: 471). But he does not say any more about what these 
modifications or this breadth would consist in. What these examples show is that we 
should not consider normal psychological functioning to bring desires immediately into line 
with judgments of goodness. Perhaps creatures with a different form of rationality, perhaps 
even creatures with a more perfect form of rationality, would be responsive to the good in 
this way, but our form of rationality is not like this. So if the question of whether I desire 
that p is answerable through deliberation about the desirability of p, then that desirability 
must be attractiveness to me rather than objective goodness.  
 
4. The Desirable As The Attractive 
 
Moran’s example of a desire being sensitive to rational deliberation is one in which the 
deliberative judgment concerns the attractiveness of the object. ‘When someone wants to 
change jobs’, he argues, this desire ‘depends for its justification on various beliefs (about 
oneself, about one’s present job and prospects elsewhere)’ and it is a normal expectation 
that changes in these beliefs that render the desire unjustified will result in no longer having 
the desire (2001: 115). What are the beliefs on which the desire rationally and 
psychologically ought to depend? Moran says only that judgment-sensitive desires depend 
on ‘beliefs about what makes these various things desirable’ (2001: 115). That is, not only 
factual beliefs about the object of desire, but also beliefs about the desirability of the 
aspects of that object picked out by these factual beliefs. We have already seen that this 
desirability cannot be understood as objective goodness, since it is implausible to suggest 
that desire is normally dependent on judgments of goodness. We should rather see the 
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judgment as dependent on the beliefs about how attractive or unattractive each aspect 
under consideration is. 
 
Since the attractiveness of the object as a whole is a matter of the attractiveness of each of 
its aspects, deliberation over whether something is desirable in this sense concerns not only 
the object itself but also one’s own existing mental states. It is properly described as a 
reflective process, because the reasoning concerns oneself, or at least one’s own desires, as 
well as the object under consideration. The desire to change jobs is dependent not only on 
beliefs about the nature of one’s current job and the nature of other jobs one might have 
instead, but also about how much one wants or does not want a job with these or those 
aspects. Thus, one can answer a question about whether one desires that p by considering 
the various aspects of p in relation to one’s desires and thereby forming a judgment about 
the overall attractiveness of p itself. 
 
If this is right, a question about one’s own desire with regard to some object is transparent 
to a question about the overall attractiveness of that object, which one is to answer through 
deliberation that considers the various aspects of that object in relation to one’s desires. 
This would not reflect a strong normative demand, if indeed there is one, that one’s desires 
ought to track the good just as one’s beliefs ought to track the truth. But it would 
nevertheless reflect a weaker normative demand that one ought not to desire some object 
overall if achieving that object would frustrate one’s desires more than it would satisfy 
them. Such a demand is not so strong that it requires consistency of desires. Yet it is strong 
enough to ground the expectation that one’s desire be sensitive to changes in information 
one has about the object of that desire. 
 
Obviously, this deliberation about the object requires one to have knowledge of one’s own 
desires. One cannot consider whether an aspect of the object meets one’s desires unless 
one knows what the relevant desires are. If this is how we are to understand deliberative 
knowledge of one’s own desires, then this is not a fundamental form of self-knowledge, for 
it rests on prior knowledge of one’s own desires. Moran’s account of self-knowledge only 
allows for one possible source of this prior knowledge, which is observation. But there are 
two good reasons to reject the idea that deliberative first-person authority over one’s 
desires rests on observational knowledge of one’s desires. One reason is that this would 
seem to undermine the claim that the transparency of desire to attractiveness grounds a 
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distinctively first-personal form of self-knowledge. If the deliberation simply involves 
making calculations on the basis of information about my desires that is in principle 
available to any observer, then in principle anyone can deliberate in this way about whether 
that object is attractive to me. 
 
The second reason is that the ambiguity of the observational evidence would undermine 
any normative demand not to desire outcomes that would have a negative net effect on the 
overall satisfaction of one’s desires. This is well illustrated by a vignette in Sartre’s novel The 
Age of Reason in which Daniel wants to prove that he is not the sentimental person that 
other people take him to be. His relationship with his cats is central to the evidence on 
which this view of him is based. So he forms the desire to drown his cats in the river Seine. 
When he gets to the water’s edge, he finds that he cannot bring himself to do it. He had 
not taken account of his strong desire to continue caring for his cats. Yet he had taken 
account of the observational evidence, which he interpreted in a way that did not indicate 
this strong desire (AR: 81-91). Observational evidence is generally, perhaps necessarily, 
open to more than one interpretation. So how could there be a normative demand to take 
one’s desires into account if one could not reliably identify them? 
 
5. The Phenomenology of Desire 
 
If desires are to be taken into account in rational decision making at all, then they must 
feature in experience in some way. For they could not motivate rational behaviour unless 
the subject were sufficiently aware of them to take them into account in the reasoning 
behind that behaviour. This is not to say that desires do not motivate behaviour in other 
ways. In some cases, for example, they might subtly direct reasoning to the desired 
conclusion through influencing the rational process itself rather than through being or 
shaping the considerations taken into account. But this would seem to be paradigmatic of 
irrational decision making. The normal role of desire in rational agency must be to 
contribute to deliberation in a way that does not undermine the rationality of that process. 
In order to play this role, they must feature in the deliberator’s experience in some way. 
 
Moran does not consider in any detail just how desires feature in experience and thus feed 
into rational deliberation. He does describe ‘brute’ desires, such as ‘those associated with 
hunger or sheer fatigue’ as ‘experienced by the person as feelings that simply come over 
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him’ and as things that ‘must simply be responded to’ much like ‘any other empirical 
phenomena’ (2001: 114-5). This idea that some desires are experienced as sensations might 
well be correct of extreme cases of these bodily desires, though as we will see the same 
desires in less extreme form are experienced in another way. But this cannot account for 
the way desires generally feature in experience. Moran rightly distances his view from the 
idea that all desires, including for example the desire to change jobs, ‘simply assail us with 
their force’ (2001: 116). His only other model of our relationship with our desires, however, 
is the deliberative model that we have seen to require some prior awareness of desire. So 
we are left with the question of how desires generally feature in experience. 
 
Sartre took this question to be central to understanding human motivation. We do not 
generally experience our desires as inner drives or forces, he argues, but rather as the 
directive structure of the world we experience. The desire to get to work on time, for 
example, is experienced in the sound of the alarm clock being experienced as a demand to 
get out of bed rather than as a mere annoyance (B&N: 62-3). Daniel is confronted with his 
own desire to continue caring for his cats when he finds he cannot bring himself to throw 
throw them into the river. The desire not to deal with slimy things is manifested not as 
sensation of disgust in their presence, but as those things themselves seeming to have the 
property of being disgusting (B&N: 630-2). Similarly, thirst can be experienced in the glass 
of water looking inviting, hunger in the plate of food seeming attractive, and tiredness in 
the difficulty of simple tasks. This account is intuitively plausible. We do not experience the 
world as an arena of physical properties to which our desires are subjective reactions. We 
experience it as already being appealing, exciting, forbidding, repulsive, and so on. But 
objects in the world can only have these properties in relation to our existing motivations.  
 
On this view, unreflective rational guidance of action is a matter of responding to this field 
of reasons for action, which in turn has been shaped by our desires (B&N: 472-3). This 
grounds an account of how we can become reflectively aware of our desires. If we wish to 
turn attention to the question of what we desire, we need only shift our focus from the 
world of objects we experience to the experience of that world. Since the experience is 
nothing but the presentation of the world as having a particular directive structure, this 
shift of attention does not provide access to some inner mental states that represent the 
world. Rather, it brings into focus the directive structure that the world is experienced as 
having. Daniel can turn his attention away from his cats and focus instead on the appeal 
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that they have for him. I can shift my attention from the alarm clock sound itself to the 
insistent demand it appears to make. This shift brings one’s desires to light. 
 
Cats and alarms are concrete perceivable objects, but the same point can be made about 
our desires in relation to more abstract things. In order to decide whether I want to change 
jobs, I must not only identify the various aspects of my current job and those of other jobs 
I might realistically have, but also identify how these aspects relate to my desires. I can do 
so by thinking about those aspects and considering how they strike me. When I think about 
my current commute, does it seem arduous? Does the prospect of spending the day with 
my colleagues seem inviting? The same can be said of Moran’s other example. I know that 
it is the trivial and disgusting nature of the activity that attracts me because I find that 
particular triviality and disgustingness appealing when I think about it. Since our desires 
shape the way their objects appear to us, then, we can access those desires by considering 
those appearances. 
 
6. Phenomenological Reflection and First-Person Authority 
 
Directing attention on one’s experience in this way is not well described as ‘introspection’. 
It does not involve looking inside anywhere. Rather, one’s attention continues to be 
directed towards the world. But this attention is no longer focused on the object itself, but 
rather on the way it seems to be. When I run after the tram, for example, my attention is 
focused on the tram itself, but I can also shift attention to the appearance of the tram as 
something-to-be-caught. In doing so, I do not direct my attention inwards: it remains 
directed outwards, towards the tram, but shifts its focus from the tram itself to how the 
tram seems. This is what Sartre describes as ‘pure reflection’ and since it is a form of 
bracketing the reality of the object to focus on its appearance, bracketing the being to focus 
on the phenomenon, it is also rightly described as a form of the phenomenological 
reduction. But this is not a technical philosophical procedure and neither is there anything 
mysterious about it. It is rather an ordinary part of everyday life. 
 
This self-awareness is a form of transparency. The idea here is not that experience itself is 
transparent to the world, presenting nothing other than its objects. Indeed, the 
transparency involved in self-awareness rests on that not being true. Sartre describes 
consciousness as ‘translucent’ (translucide), not transparent (B&N: 67, 72, 78, 101, 119, 357, 
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409). The difference between these terms in French is the same as in English: whereas one 
can see objects plainly through a transparent object, like an ordinary window, a translucent 
object distorts the way those objects seem. Our motives distort the appearance of things. It 
is this translucency of our experience of the world that allows for the logical transparency, 
in Moran’s sense of the word, of questions about one’s own desires to questions about how 
the world appears to one. To answer the question about whether one desires that p, one 
needs to direct attention to the prospect of p, either as a whole or in its various aspects, and 
report on how that prospect seems to one. 
 
Moreover, this phenomenological reflection meets the criteria that Moran lays down for an 
acceptable theory of first-person authority (2001: 32-5). First, it is inherently first-personal. 
The way the world seems to you is something that is directly epistemically accessible only 
to you. I might infer it from your behaviour, as indeed can you, but this is an indirect 
access to the information. Or I could ask you how things seem to you, but this rests on 
your already having access to that information. Only you can be directly aware of how 
things seem to you. Second, it is clear why we only have this access to some aspects of 
ourselves and not others. Since phenomenological reflection is attention to the way the 
world seems in experience, it can provide access only to states of ourselves that are 
manifested in that seeming. This can include some physical states such as hunger, thirst, 
and tiredness, as well as mental states such as desires, but would generally exclude the 
details of our health. Moreover, in focusing on desire rather than belief and intention as its 
central case, this is an account of epistemic access to what is arguably the core of 
mindedness, the core of being an agent who seeks to change things. 
 
Most importantly, this account shows first-person authority to be integral to rational 
agency rather than something additional to it. Moran’s account of first-person authority 
over belief rests on the ability to make up one’s own mind through deliberation. Moran 
points out that this puts rational agency at the centre of the account (2001: 150-1). But this 
is only because this first-person authority supervenes on rational agency. That is, the ability 
to express the deliberative judgment as an avowal of belief does not itself seem essential to 
the ability to form beliefs through deliberative judgment or to the ability to express beliefs 
in words and actions. The phenomenological account of first-person authority over desire, 
by contrast, has the implication that this epistemic authority is essential to rational agency. 
For one cannot rationally shape one’s desires without regard to one’s other desires. 
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Deliberation about the desirability of some outcome rationally ought to take into account 
one’s existing desires. 
 
Should we consider this self-knowledge to be another kind of first-person authority 
alongside the deliberative kind that Moran describes? Once an account of first-person 
authority is available that covers cases that Moran’s cannot cover, the question arises 
whether it can be extended to displace Moran’s (O’Brien 2003: 379). Deliberative first-
person authority over desire rests on this phenomenological reflection on one’s existing 
desires, so inherits its status as authoritative from it. A similar point can be made about 
knowledge of one’s own intentions. When he formed the intention to drown his cats, 
Sartre’s character Daniel should have reflected on his desires concerning those cats. One’s 
intentions are not authoritative unless formed with due regard to one’s existing desires. But 
we have already seen that the question of what one believes differs in being directly 
transparent to the truth, rather than transparent to what one has reason to believe. It might 
turn out, on further consideration, that deliberation about the truth rests on something 
parallel to phenomenological reflection on desire. For now, however, we should conclude 
only that rational agency in the practical sphere rests on phenomenological reflection. 
 
7. Two Strands of Sartre’s Thought 
 
Moran develops his account of first-person authority in part through his analysis of Sartre’s 
example of the akratic gambler (2001: 78-83; B&N: 56-7). This gambler has resolved not to 
gamble again, but that does not help him to resist the charms of the casino in front of him. 
Moran argues that this is because the theoretical perspective that I can take towards my 
own intention, or resolution, as grounding a prediction of my behaviour depends on my 
own deliberative relation to the content of the same intention or resolution. ‘I must 
recognise’, writes Moran, ‘that the resolution only exists as a fact on which anyone can base 
a prediction insofar as I continue to endorse it’ (2001: 82). When the gambler feels his 
commitment to not gambling is not strong enough, the reason that turning to his 
resolution for support will not help him is that the resolution itself is only as strong as his 
current commitment to not gambling. 
 
This is a subtle and illuminating account of Sartre’s example. Moran uses it to develop the 
idea that intentions are sensitive to deliberative judgment in the way that grounds his 
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theory of first-person authority. He extends the case by drawing on Sartre’s thoughts about 
ascribing beliefs to oneself (B&N: 92-3). Why would I treat my belief itself, such as my 
belief that Pierre is my friend, as evidence for the truth of that belief? I would do so only if 
I am no longer confident about whether the content of that belief is true and I cannot find 
sufficient reasons for it elsewhere. But this motivating state itself means that the belief 
cannot provide good evidence, since the fact that someone – whether myself or anyone 
else – unconfidently believes that Pierre is my friend does not provide me with good reason 
to believe that Pierre is my friend (2001: 83). However, this parallel reasoning concerning 
intentions and beliefs does not consider whether the same can be said about desire or what 
difference a consideration of desire would make to the case of intention.  
 
Sartre’s discussion of his example similarly overlooks desire. Why is the gambler tempted 
when faced with a casino? Because he has a persisting desire to gamble. This grounds an 
important disanalogy between intentions and beliefs. When forming intentions, one ought 
to take into account not only one’s existing intentions but also one’s desires. Deliberation 
resulting in belief, on the other hand, needs to be sensitive only to one’s other beliefs, not 
to one’s mental states of any other kind. For this reason, it can seem odd that Sartre 
describes the akratic gambler as discovering his radical freedom through his awareness that 
his prior intention cannot help him to resist temptation. The gambler has resolved to resist 
his desire and then finds that the desire persists while the strength of his resolution does 
not, just as Daniel is confronted with his recalcitrant desire to care for his cats. This is why 
Sartre’s example can look rather more like an illustration of the limitations of freedom. It 
looks as though the lesson to be learned is that the gambler should have taken his desires 
into account more carefully when making his decision, with the implication that he is no 
longer free to choose to give up gambling. 
 
This oddness is due to the structure of Being and Nothingness, which is not a series of 
arguments for discrete conclusions but rather the progressive elaboration of an overall 
philosophy none of whose aspects are fully articulated until the elaboration is complete. 
Sartre goes on to argue that one’s desires are themselves dependent on one’s deliberative 
judgment. Desires are grounded in the projects that I pursue, or more precisely in the 
values at their core, he argues, and persist only while I endorse those values and so remain 
committed to those projects (B&N: 459; Webber 2009: chapters 3-5). Sartre sometimes 
seems to hold that we can shape our desires through deliberative judgment about the 
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desirability of their objects, even though this would bring with it an alteration in the 
projects in which they are grounded (B&N: 486, 497-8). But in other passages, he seems to 
hold that we have only indirect control over our desires through deliberation over our 
projects, values, or their objects, which is why we can need the help of an existential 
psychoanalyst to uncover the project in which a desire is grounded (B&N: 495, 591). Either 
way, the gambler is not constrained by his desire to gamble, even though he has failed to 
consider just how strong that desire is and thus just how difficult it will be for him to 
abandon the old project of gambling. 
 
Ultimately, this vacillation is due to the tension between two strands of thought in Being and 
Nothingness. One strand elaborates the idea that my mental states have no inertia of their 
own, but persist only with my endorsement. The other develops the idea that the reasons 
for action that I find in the world reflect the projects I have already undertaken. Moran 
focuses almost exclusively on the first of these (see e.g. 2001: 140). This distorts his picture 
of the formation of intention by ignoring the apparent inertia of desire, a distortion which 
occludes the differences between the theoretical attitude of belief and the practical attitudes 
of desire and intention. This is what has led Moran to an account of first-person authority 
in general that cannot be fundamental in the case of the practical attitudes. The idea that 
first-person authority over desires and intentions is rooted in phenomenological reflection, 
on the other hand, is consistent with each strand of Sartre’s thought. But it does not 
require Sartre’s particular elaborations of either strand and Sartre’s vacillation concerning 
deliberative control of desire suggests that the two strands might not be mutually 
consistent. Whether that suggestion is correct and what difference it makes to first-person 
authority, however, are questions for another time.1 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 This paper was developed through presentations at Cardiff University work-in-progress 
seminar, Kings College London philosophy society, the visiting speaker seminar at 
Manchester Metropolitan University, and the 2013 conference of the Nordic Society for 
Phenomenology at University of Copenhagen. I am grateful to the organisers and 
participants of these for helping to shape my thoughts on this issue. I am also grateful to 
the editors of this volume for helpful feedback on the first draft of the paper. 
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